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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BLAKE D. PETERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 981675-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals his conviction following entry of a conditional guilty plea to one 
count of possession of a controlled substance, a third-degree felony, in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in and for Utah County, Utah, Honorable Judge Ray M. Harding presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction of the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Assuming officers seized defendant by driving up behind him 
on a narrow pull-out, did the trial court correctly hold that 
officers' actions were justified as an exercise of their 
community caretaker function, where the officers were 
investigating a report that an armed, suicidal person was in 
the area in a car that matched the general description of 
defendant's car? 
"We review the factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress under a clearly erroneous standard.... We review the trial court's conclusions 
based on the totality of those facts for correctness." State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1226-
27 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted). 
2. Did the trial court correctly hold that officers had reasonable 
suspicion to detain defendant after defendant, who was seated in 
a parked car as officers drove up behind him, made furtive 
movements with his hand below the driver's seat, and then 
jumped out of the car, walked around the front of the car and 
threw a metallic object into the woods? 
"This court has previously noted 'no analytical distinction among a trial 
court's determinations of when a seizure occurs, of reasonable suspicion, or of 
voluntary consent for purposes of the applicable standard of review.'" State v. 
Bean. 869 P.2d 984, 985 n.2 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 
460, 465 n.3 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992)). 
"[Wjhether a particular set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a question 
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. The legal standard for reasonable 
suspicion, however, 'is highly fact dependent and the fact patterns are quite 
variable.' The legal standard therefore conveys a measure of discretion to the trial 
court in our application of the correctness standard to a given set of facts." State v. 
Chapman. 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 
939-40 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted)); see also State v. Hodson. 907 P.2d 1155, 
1157 (Utah 1995). 
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant \\as L'liiiigt'iI iMi-i I »l.iy III, I - -
-in fmethamphetamine), a third-degree felony under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998); one count of unlawful possession drug 
paraphernalia, a Class-B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 5g_37a_5(|) (Supp. 
1998); one count of having an open alii tlioln IK" ci jge i oiitamu in <i in tlni 
* ''lii' I- » «1'i^4 ' ii isdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 (1998); and 
one count of littering, a Class-C misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-115 
(1998) (R. 3-4). A preliminary hearing was held September 20, 1996 (1 
Defer * ! Motion to Suppress evidence found by officers at the time 
of his arrest (R. 47-58). The trial court denied the motion on February 28, 1997 
(R, 107-112). 
Defendant entered a plea of guiii .. f 
conditioned on retention of his right to appeal 
the denial of his motion to suppress (R. 113-126). The State dismissed the 
remaining charges (R. 123). The trial court sentenced defendant to a suspended 
term of zero-to-five years in prison, and imposed 36 months of probation (R. 138-
40). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 142). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 19, 1996 at around 4 p.m., Utah County Sheriffs Deputies David 
Knowles and Harold Curtis received a dispatch call that an individual known to 
frequent the Squaw Peak area was suicidal and armed with a gun (R. 75, 147 at 4-5, 
14). According to the message, the individual was driving a blue Ford Tempo (R. 
75, 147 at 14). The deputies, in separate cars, set out to search for the individual 
(R. 147 at 5). 
The deputies drove onto Archery Road (id.). As they came up to the first 
pull-out on the east side of the road, the deputies saw a blue passenger car through 
the trees which matched the description of the vehicle they were looking for (R. 73, 
75, 147 at 5). Knowles radioed Curtis, who was directly behind him, and the two 
lawmen turned into the pull-out (R. 147 at 5-6). The pull-out was a narrow road 
that led to a small camping spot, and the blue car was parked in the middle of the 
road (R. 147 at 26). Knowles pulled up behind the blue car (R. 147 at 6). He did 
not activate his patrol car's overhead lights (id.). However, because of the narrow 
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road, his car blocked the blue car's only exit (K 
•fendant 
seat, making "furtive movements with his left hand. It looked as if he was doing 
something with his left hand at the bottom of his seat" (R. 147 at 6). As Knowles 
stopped his car, defendant got out, walked around the front of the car in a hurried 
mam a 
(idL,R ' 75) ' " .'. ': 
Deputy Curtis also saw defendant throw the object (R. 147 at T- Tie got out 
of his patrol car and ordered defendant to place his hands on his head (id.). 
I )c fend11 in i in u implied nidi" i inns lelneuvill' iilliii nn dilh ih|i i iimnm linn mud's yd!,). 
If was a long, black pipe with marijuana in the bowl, still warm (id, R. 73) 
At this point, the deputies were still uncertain whether they had located the 
vehicle they had been looking for (R. 147 at 10, 15). Knowles walked up to the 
blue i'di, and sav> scu'ii i l nlhei people inside ( I ' I I >l I I ihsemiiL1 Ihe i J< 'S 
occupai its "acting si lspicioi is, making furtive movements," Knowles told them to 
place their hands where he could see them (R. 147 at 10). When they did so, he 
saw an open Budweiser "Tall Boy" can on the floor of the back seat (R 7 \ 14 / at 
Ml! Il II MI I I mm li k iu) dim in i up ml mil ml Ihc in I II ! Il ill III I ). ' • 
When he reached in to pick up the open beer can, he smelled a strong odor of 
marijuana inside the car (R. 147 at 10). 
Knowles searched the car and found, in the driver's door pocket, a package 
of Zig-Zag rolling papers and a piece of paper with a "rock" of methamphetamine 
rolled up inside it (R. 76, 147 at 11, 21). Defendant and his cohorts were placed 
under arrest (R. 76-78). 
In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that the deputies unlawfully 
detained him without reasonable suspicion when they stopped behind his car on the 
pull-out (R. 47-58). He also claimed that the "stop" was not justified as a 
community caretaker stop (id.). The trial court denied the motion: 
The Court agrees that at some point, a level two stop of the 
Defendant occurred, and he was seized. The Court disagrees with the 
Defendant, however, as to when the stop occurred.... The Defendant 
clearly did not feel completely restrained by the mere presence of the 
deputy's vehicle behind him, since he got out and threw something into the 
woods. It was only after he had thrown the object that his freedom was 
restrained by the deputies. 
The Defendant's car was already stopped in the pull-out when the 
deputies approached and he was clearly free to move around, similar to the 
defendant in Jackson [1] . . . . The Defendant did not voluntarily approach 
the deputies and initiate the contact, but that is only because before he 
could do so, he threw the pipe into the woods, an act which created a 
reasonable suspicion in the deputies' minds of criminal activity. 
The furtive movements alone of the Defendant do not provide a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. However, when viewed in the 
totality of the circumstances, the furtive movements coupled with the 
attempt to conceal the metallic object by throwing it into the woods does 
*The trial court was referring to State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1991), 
wherein this Court found that no seizure occurred when officer stopped his patrol car in 
front of the defendant's car, blocking its exit. Id. at 768. The Court noted that the officer 
did not block the car until after defendant had exited the car, and that the defendant 
voluntarily initiated a conversation with the officer. Id. 
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create a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity authorizing 
the deputies to temporarily detain the Defendant while they investigated. 
Since these actions occurred prior to, or contemporaneously with Deputy 
Knowles blocking the exit to the pull-out with his vehicle, the Court finds 
that the subsequent seizure of the defendant was appropriate. Once the 
deputies had located the marijuana pipe in the woods, in addition to 
viewing the open containers of alcohol in the vehicle, they had reasonable 
suspicion sufficient to justify searching the car without a warrant. 
The Deputies's [sic] original purpose in pulling in behind the 
Defendant's vehicle was to ascertain whether or not this was the vehicle 
possibly containing the suicidal individual. 
The Court finds that Deputy's [sic] Knowles and Curtis were acting 
in a reasonable manner when they pulled in behind the Defendant's 
vehicle. It is ludicrous to expect the deputies to make a determination of 
whether or not this was the vehicle they were looking for without pulling 
off of the main road and inspecting the blue vehicle they had spotted from 
the road. Indeed, it would be unreasonable for them, suspecting someone's 
life was in imminent danger not to investigate. It is unclear from the 
record how specific the description of the vehicle they were looking for 
was, but it is evident to the Court that the Defendant's vehicle has enough 
similar characteristics to lead the deputies to pull in behind the Defendant's 
vehicle and investigate. Therefore, the Court finds that the second 
prong of the [community caretaker] test was met and the Defendant was 
seized pursuant to a reasonable community caretaker stop, 
(R. -ntv i L reproduced in Addendum A). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court found that a detention did not occur until after defendant threv 
piju, nil ilic unod1, ii'ii I iiti! ilHniiliini \ i nntniiiim il I L ill Mir tlrniHies sei Ttl Hun nm i 
they pulled up behind him. Importantly, defendant does not challenge the trial court's 
primary holding as to when the detention occurred. Instead, defendant attacks the trial 
7 
court's alternative holding that, even if a detention had occurred as the deputies pulled up, 
it was justified as an exercise of the officers' community caretaker function because the 
officers were investigating a report that an individual driving a car similar to defendant's 
vehicle was armed, suicidal, and in the area. Defendant maintains that no reasonable 
officer would have pulled in behind defendant's car because it was a Dodge and the 
suicidal individual was reportedly driving a Ford. However, the record shows that the 
officers were not able to determine the make of the car from the main road, and had to 
drive into the pull-out to investigate more closely. The deputies'actions were appropriate 
in accordance with their community caretaker responsibilities. 
The officers' detention of defendant after he threw the pipe into the woods was 
supported by reasonable suspicion. As Deputy Knowles drove up, he saw defendant 
fumbling below the driver's seat with his left hand. As the deputy stopped, defendant left 
the car, walked around the front of the car and tossed the metallic object into the woods. 
The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the totality of the circumstances was that 
defendant was attempting to conceal evidence of a crime from police. The seizure which 




THE DEPUTIES WERE JUSTIFIED IN PULLING UP BEHIND 
DEFENDANT'S PARKED VEHICLE BECAUSE, IN A PROPER 
EXERCISE OF THEIR COMMUNITY CARETAKER FUNCTION, 
THEY WERE ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT A SUICIDE 
Defendant li.i", n >l aiipiiinil on ,ip|' .MI lli.it the trial court erred in concluding that 
defendant was not seized under the Fourth Amendment until after he threw the marijuana 
pipe into the woods (R. 110).2 Nor does defendant attack the trial court's finding that 
"defendant clearly did not feel completely restrained by the present 
2Failure to challenge a trial court's ruling on appeal establishes the court's ruling 
as the law of the case, precluding judicial review. State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228, 
1229 (Utah App. 1992) ("In general, if a defendant has not raised an issue on appeal, "'? 
may not consider the issue sua sponte"). 
However, even if defendant had contested the trial court's conclusion that no 
seizure occurred until after defendant threw the pipe into the woods, the trial court was 
correct as a matter of law. As the trial court correctly recognized, there is no seizure 
pursuant to a police show of authority unless the subject actually yields to the authority. 
In California v. HodarL 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court considered a 
case where a defendant fled from a pursuing officer on foot. The officer intercepted the 
defendant via an alternate route. The defendant saw the officer and tossed away a rock of 
crack cocaine just before the officer tackled him. The Court held that the trial court 
properly denied a motion to suppress the cocaine, ruling that even if the officer had 
engaged in a "show of authority" by chasing the defendant, the defendant did not yield to 
the "show of authority" by stopping. Id at 629. No seizure occurred until the officer 
tackled the defendant. IdL 
In this case, as in HodarL defendant did not yield to the officers' alleged "show of 
authority." Instead of remaining in his seat or coming out to talk to the officers, as would 
be expected of someone whose freedom had truly been restrained, he hastily bailed out of 
the car in the direction opposite the officers to throw his pipe in the woods, thereby 
evading any encounter with the officers until he was ordered to place his hands on his 
head. 
vehicle behind him since he got out and threw something into the woods'1 (id.). Instead, 
defendant challenges the trial court's alternative holding that even if a detention had 
occurred prior to that point, the officers were justified in pulling behind defendant's 
parked vehicle in the exercise of their community caretaker functions (R. 109-110). 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Officers Were Acting as 
Community Caretakers In Pulling Up Behind Defendant 
In Provo Citv v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1992), affd 875 p.2d 557 
(Utah 1994), this Court held that law enforcement officers are authorized to stop vehicles 
in the exercise of their community caretaking functions for purposes unrelated to penal or 
regulatory enforcement. In that case, the Court set forth a three-tiered test to be used in 
evaluating the legitimacy of a community caretaker stop: 
First, did a seizure occur under the Fourth Amendment definition of that 
term? Second, based upon an objective analysis, was the seizure in pursuit 
of a bona fide community caretaker function - under the given 
circumstances, would a reasonable officer have stopped a vehicle for a 
purpose consistent with community caretaker functions? Third, based upon 
an objective analysis, did the circumstances demonstrate an imminent 
danger to life or limb? 
Id at 364. 
Below and on appeal, defendant admits that the first and third elements of the test 
are met. Appellant's Brief at 10. His only challenge is whether, under the second 
element, a reasonable officer would have stopped defendant's blue Dodge where the 
suicidal individual was reportedly in a blue Ford. Id Defendant argues that at 4 o'clock 
10 
on an April afternoon, the officers should have been able to see that they had the wrong 
car. Id. 
However, despite what the officers "should" have been able to see, the record is 
unequivocal that the officers were not able to determine from the main road whether 
defendant's car matched that of the suicide risk.3 The evidence strongly supports the trial 
court's findings that the officers' sole purpose in pulling behind defendant's vehicle was 
to ascertain the make and model of the car, and that before Deputy Knowles "could pull 
close enough behind the vehicle to make that determination, the Defendant pulled 
something from underneath the sear, exited the vehicle and threw it into the woods" (R. 
109). Deputy Knowles testified that when he first spotted defendant's car, he believed 
that it matched the description of the blue car the officers were searching for (R. 147 at 
5). Both officers' written reports of the incident indicated that defendant's car was the 
same color as the one they were seeking (R. 73, 75). Furthermore, Deputy Curtis's report 
stated that the officers viewed defendant's car "through the trees," indicating that their 
viewpoint was somewhat obstructed (R. 73). Knowles testified that even after pulling 
into the pullout and observing defendant fling the metallic object into the bushes, the 
officers still had not verified whether they had located the car they were originally 
3Although defendant asserts that the dispatch report concerned a suicidal 
individual, and that the officers "must have been close enough to realize" that the car 
contained more that one person, the record nowhere indicates that the officers were able 
to determine from the main road the number of people in the car. Appellant's Brief at 7-
8. 
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looking for (R. 147 at 10). On cross-examination, the officer stated that when he received 
the dispatch report about the suicidal individual, "I don't think I wrote it down. I believe 
I just made a mental note that it was a blue vehicle" (R. 147 at 13). And, although he 
stated at the hearing that he is now "much better at [distinguishing a Ford from a Dodge] 
than I was," Knowles did not testify that he was able to determine the make of 
defendant's car without getting close to it (R. 147 at 15). 
In short, it is clear from the record that the officers were not able at first glance to 
eliminate defendant's car as belonging to the individual reported to be suicidal. In order 
to confirm or disprove that the blue car they saw through the trees contained the armed 
and suicidal person they sought, the officers were required to come closer to investigate. 
Under the circumstances, in order to deter a suicide, a reasonable officer would be 
expected to do no less. Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d at 365 ("prevention of a suicide 
is consistent with an officer's community caretaker function"). Indeed, as the trial court 
found, the officers would have been seriously derelict in performance of their duties if, 
knowing that a life was in danger, they had driven away simply because they could not 
determine the car's make through the trees (R. 109). The officers engaged in a valid 
exercise of their community caretaking function in driving up to defendant's car. 
12 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT'S 
FURTIVE MOVEMENTS, COUPLED WITH HIS THROWING THE 
MARIJUANA PIPE INTO THE WOODS, PROVIDED OFFICERS WITH 
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN HIM 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding that defendant's furtive 
movements, together with his actions in throwing the pipe into the woods, were 
insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion to detain him. Although defendant's 
furtive movements alone may have been insufficient to create reasonable suspicion, those 
actions coupled with defendant's hasty and overt act of throwing the pipe into the woods 
gave rise to the reasonable (in fact, inescapable) suspicion that defendant was trying to 
conceal evidence of a crime from police. Under the totality of the circumstances, the 
officers were justified in detaining defendant. 
Utah's appellate courts recognize three levels of police-citizen encounters: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a 
person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense had been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). 
The determination of articulable suspicion is fact intensive. See State v. Struhs, 
940 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Utah App. 1997). The test "'considers] the totality of the 
13 
circumstances to determine whether the officer had "specific and articulable facts" to 
support suspicion.'" State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting 
State v. Munsen. 821 P.2d 13,15 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio. 342 U.S. 1, 21 
(1968)). "'The level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding 
than that for probable cause.'" Strickling, 844 P.2d at 982 (quoting United States v. 
Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989^), 
The evidence is clear that upon seeing the officers pull up, defendant immediately 
left his car, walked around the front of the car — away from the officers — and threw a 
black metallic object into the bushes. As he drove up, Deputy Knowles observed 
defendant "doing something with his left hand at the bottom of his seat" (R. 147 at 6). As 
the deputy stopped his car, defendant left his car, walked around the front and threw the 
pipe into the woods (id.). Deputy Curtis's incident report indicates that "[w]e were 
pulling in to the pull out, and I saw [defendant] throw a black and metallic object in to the 
bushes to the south of the car" (R. 73). Since defendant's fumbling below his seat and 
hasty exit from his vehicle to throw the object into the woods were obviously a response 
to the arrival of the officers, the totality of the circumstances created a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the metallic object defendant threw into the woods was a 
weapon or other instrumentality of criminal activity. And, since the officers were looking 
for an armed individual and could reasonably have believed that the object thrown was a 
weapon, their ordering defendant to place his hands on his head was a justifiable 
14 
precaution to ensure the officers' own safety while they investigated, in the event that 
defendant possessed other weapons. See. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,453 (Utah 
1995) (where officer received report that defendant was known to carry a gun and ordered 
defendant to exit car and place his hands on his head, he was entitled to follow "ordinary 
safety procedures" to protect himself, including ordering defendant out of car; no 
improper detention occurred until after officers determined that defendant was unarmed). 
The record therefore clearly supports the trial court's conclusion that "when 
viewed in the totality of the circumstances, the furtive movements coupled with the 
attempt to conceal the metallic object by throwing it into the woods does create a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity . . . . Since these actions occurred 
prior to, or contemporaneously with Deputy Knowles blocking the exit to the pull-out 
with his vehicle, the court finds that the subsequent seizure of the Defendant was 
appropriate" (R. 110). Cf State v. Hodson. 886 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah App. 1993) (while 
furtive gesture alone insufficient to establish probable cause, "'deliberately furtive actions 
and flight at the approach of... law officers are strong indicia of mens rea '" . . . . 
(citation omitted) "\ .. suspicious movements, which occurred immediately after the 
detectives revealed their identity as police officers, gave rise to a reasonable inference 
that defendant did, in fact possess drugs . . . '" (citation omitted)), rev'd on other grounds, 
907 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1995). 
Defendant implies that because his furtive movements and throwing of the object 
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into the woods may also have been consistent with innocent activity, the officers lacked 
reasonable suspicion to detain him after observing those activities.4 Appellant's Brief at 
8. However, even if his actions were consistent with innocence, they were nevertheless 
strongly indicative of criminal conduct. Provo City Corp. v. Spotts. 861 P.2d 437, 440 
(Utah App. 1993) ("where a defendant's conduct is 'conceivably consistent with innocent 
. . . activity,' but is also 'strongly indicative' of criminal activity, we will not hesitate to 
conclude that reasonable suspicion exists" (citation omitted)); see also State v. Chapman, 
841 P.2d 725, 727 (Utah App. 1993), rev, in part on other grounds. 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 
1995). Thus, reasonable suspicion existed to support his detention. 
4The State does not agree that defendant's actions were consistent with innocent 
activity because even if defendant had been simply tossing an innocuous metallic object 
into the woods, he would still have been, at minimum, littering in front of the officers. In 
so doing, defendant subjected himself to arrest or detention. It is a crime for any person 
to "throw, deposit, or discard, or to permit to be dropped, thrown, deposited, or discarded 
upon any . . . public or private land . . . any glass bottle, glass, nails, tacks, wire, cans, 
barbed wire, boards, trash or garbage, paper or paper products, or any other substance 
which would or could mar or impair the scenic aspect or beauty of the land . . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-1-114 (Supp. 1998). 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995), "[a] peace officer may stop any person 
in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in 
the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense...." In addition, "[a] 
peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, 
arrest a person . . . for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any 
peace officer." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) (1995). 
The record in this case is uncontroverted that the officers were present when 
defendant threw the marijuana pipe into the woods (R. 73, 75, 147 at 6-8, 16-17). His 
actions fell under the statutory definition of littering, a crime with which he was 
ultimately charged (R. 3). Therefore, the officers were authorized to detain or arrest him. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
i 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 961400720 
DATE: February 28, 1997 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having 
received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of and opposition to 
the Motion, the Court hereby denies the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
On April 19, 1996, at approximately 4:00pm, Deputies Harold Curtis and David 
Knowles of the Utah County Sheriffs Office received a report of a suicidal person, possibly 
armed with a gun, driving a blue Ford Tempo who may be in the Squaw Peak area. As 
Deputies Curtis and Knowles drove up Archery Road looking for the vehicle, they spotted a 
blue vehicle parked in a pullout off of the road. 
Deputy Knowles turned into the pullout, to ascertain whether or not this was the 
vehicle they were looking for. As he pulled up behind the blue car, he saw the Defendant get 
out of the car and throw a shiny, metallic object into the woods. Deputy Curtis, pulling in 
behind Deputy Knowles also saw the occupant of the car throw the object, then saw the other 
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occupants begin to exit the car. He ordered them back into the vehicle, then approached the 
vehicle and asked the Defendant what he had thrown into the woods. The Defendant denied 
throwing anything, so Deputy Curtis went to search in the area he had seen the object thrown 
while Deputy Knowles approached the car to secure the rest of the occupants while the 
Deputies were conducting their investigation. 
Deputy Knowles observed an open container of beer in the car and ordered the 
occupants out of the car. As he was retrieving the open container of beer, he noticed the 
smell of marijuana inside the car. Deputy Knowles searched the car and found 
methamphetamine folded inside a "Camel Buck" along with zig zag papers inside the driver's 
side door pocket. Deputy Curtis located a marijuana pipe from the area where he saw the 
Defendant throw the object. The pipe was still warm, was not wet or covered with dirt, and 
had marijuana residue inside the bowl. 
Opinion of the Court 
L THE DEPUTIES HAD A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO 
EXECUTE A LEVEL TWO STOP AND TEMPORARILY DETAIN THE 
DEFENDANT. 
The Defendant argues that when Deputy Knowles pulled in and blocked the exit 
with his vehicle that at that point the Defendant was seized and entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protections. The Defendant relies on State v. Smith 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989) to claim 
that a level two stop occurred without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
and that the facts in this case are entirely distinguishable from those in State v. Jackson 805 
P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1990), where the court found a seizure had not occurred. 
The Court agrees that at some point, a level two stop of the Defendant occurred and 
he was seized. The Court disagrees with the Defendant, however, as to when the stop 
occurred. The facts in this case seem to fall somewhere in between Smith and Jackson. 
Deputy Knowles testified that as he was pulling in behind the Defendant's vehicle, stopping 
2 
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his vehicle and calling in the stop, he saw the Defendant reach underneath his seat, exit the 
car and throw a metallic object into the woods. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, hereinafter 
tipjjpi jg^
 H e ^j n o t jnj tja t e the si0p9 ^ the 0ff lcer in Smith dicL1 however, the Defendant 
did not approach Deputy Knowles and initiate the contact as the defendant in Jackson did. 
The Defendant clearly did notjeeLEpjnplet^^ mere presence of the deputy's 
vehicle behind him, since he got out and threw something into the woods. It was only after 
he had thrown the object that his freedomj^j"estr^ 
The Defendant's car was already stopped in the pull-out when the deputies 
approached and he was clearly free to move around, similar to the defendant in Jackson. Id. at 
768. The Defendant did not voluntarily approach the deputies and initiate the contact, but 
that is only because before he could do so, he threw the pipe into the woods, an act which 
created a reasonable suspicion in the deputies' minds of criminal activity. 
The furtive movements alone of the Defendant do not provide a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. However, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances j^tlie^ 
furtive movements coupled with the attempt to conceal the metallic objectjoy thjowigjtjnto 
the woods does create a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity authorizing the 
deputies to temporarily detain the Defendant while they investigated. Since these actions 
occurred prior to, or contemporan^uslywithJDeputy Knowles blocking the exit to the pull-
out with his vehicle, the Qpuitiind^hatJhe^s^ seizure ofthe Defendant was 
appropriate. Once the deputies had located the marijuana pipe in the woods, in addition to 
viewing the open containers of alcohol in the vehicle, they had reasonable suspicion sufficient 
to justify searching the car without a warrant. 
II. THE STOP IS JUSTIFIED IN THE ALTERNATIVE AS A COMMUNITY 
CARETAKER STOP. 
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The Deputies's original purpose in pulling in behind the Defendant's vehicle was to 
ascertain whether or not this was the vehicle possibly containing the suicidal individual. 
From the roadway, Deputy Knowles saw the vehicle in the pullout was a blue sedan. He 
pulled into the pull-out, behind the Defendant's car to investigate whether or not this was, in 
fact, the blue Ford Tempo he was looking for. 
The Defendant does not take issue with the first and third factors of the community 
caretaker stop test as defined in Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah App. 1992). 
However, the Defendant claims that the second factor, whether the police conduct was bona 
fide community caretaker activity, has not been met. The Defendant bases his argument on 
the fact that the car the deputies were looking for was a blue Ford Tempo, whereas his car is 
a blue Dodge. 
The Court finds the Defendant's argument unpersuasive. The area the deputies were 
searching is heavily wooded and the Defendant's car was parked off of the main road on a 
side road or "pull-out" which leads to a camping spot. Deputy Knowles testified that from 
the main road all that he could see was that a blue passenger car was parked in the pull-out. 
Because of the physical circumstances, he was not able to ascertain whether the car was a 
Ford Tempo or not. His sole purpose in pulling in behind the Defendant's vehicle was to 
determine the make and model of the car to see if it matched his description. Before he 
could pull close enough behind the vehicle to make that determination, the Defendant pulled 
something from underneath the seat, exited the vehicle and threw it into the woods. 
The Court finds that Deputy's Knowles and Curtis were acting in a reasonable 
manner when they pulled in behind the Defendant's vehicle. It is ludicrous to expect the 
deputies to make a determination of whether or not this was the vehicle they were looking for 
without pulling off of the main road and inspecting the blue vehicle they had spotted from the 
road. Indeed, it would be unreasonable for them, suspecting that someone's life was in 
imminent danger not to investigate. It is unclear from the record how specific the description 
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of the vehicle they were looking for was, but it is evident to the Court that the Defendant's 
vehicle has enough similar characteristics to lead the deputies to pull in behind the 
Defendant's vehicle and investigate. Indeed the Court finds that the deputies, as the officer in 
Warden were not acting within their duties of "detection, investigation, or acquisition of 
evidence relating to the commission of crimes" when they observed the suspicious activities 
of the Defendant. Id. at 365. Therefore, the Court finds that the second prong of the test was 
met and the Defendant was seized pursuant to a reasonable community caretaker stop. 
Order 
The Defendant's motion is denied. 
DATED this 3rd day of March, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Utah County Public Defender 
